A Better Antivirus Download

Free, open source, for Windows, macOS and Linux

Catch infostealers in the act.

Infostealers are programs that sweep the saved passwords, crypto wallets and app logins off your PC and upload them, usually within seconds. ABA plants fake ones exactly where they look. Your own apps have no reason to open them. When something suspicious does, ABA freezes it, typically about a tenth of a second later.

Despite the name, keep Windows Defender on. ABA isn't an antivirus. It's the tripwire for what gets past one. Why both?

stealer's-eye view Simulation

You're the stealer.

This is what a stealer finds on a PC running ABA. The ones marked bait are ABA's. With JavaScript on, you can try to rob it.

C:\Users\sam\Desktop

  • passwords.txtbait
  • invoice_march.pdfreal

C:\Users\sam\Documents

  • wallet recovery phrase.txtbait
  • Passwords.kdbxbait
  • tax return 2025.pdfreal

…\Google\Chrome\User Data Sam uses Chrome

  • DefaultLogin Data, Cookiesreal
  • Profile 23Login Data, Cookiesbait
  • Local Statereal

C:\Users\sam\AppData apps Sam doesn't have

  • discord\Local Storage\leveldbbait
  • Exodus\exodus.walletbait
  • Telegram Desktop\tdatabait
  • Opera Software\Opera Stablebait

C:\Users\sam

  • .aws\credentialsbait

The real thing in action: a real stealer, frozen in 158 ms.

It's not an antivirus.
It's a better one.*

The name is a joke. Keep Windows Defender on.

Antivirus tries to stop malware before it runs. ABA is the tripwire for when something gets past it, and that's the part antivirus is bad at. They do different jobs. Use both.

Not a simulation

A real infostealer. Defender off.
Frozen in 158 ms.

A real Discord token stealer, disguised as a game, on a Windows 11 test machine with Windows Defender switched off. It went for a fake Discord token. ABA froze it 158 ms later, before it could send anything. 47 s, with music, no speech.
Read what happens in the video
  1. Text on a black screen: “This is a real Discord token stealer. Windows Defender is off.”
  2. ABA is installed on a Windows 11 test machine with one command. Setup ends with “armed” and 18 bait files planted: fake passwords, wallets and tokens.
  3. The desktop. A file called “passwords” is highlighted: it's a bait.
  4. “Now the stealer.” A file called zombiesurvival.jar, which looks like a game, is double-clicked. A timer starts.
  5. About two seconds later a popup appears: “ABA: javaw.exe opened a bait”. It says the program read the Discord token store and, under “What ABA did”: “Froze it”. A red stamp reads “Frozen. 158 ms after it touched the bait. Before it could send anything.”
  6. “It went for the Discord token. A fake one. It's bait.”
  7. The popup asks what should happen. “Yes = Kill it” is clicked.
  8. ABA's full report in a terminal: what the program read, what launched it, its hash. It ends with “frozen, then killed”. A check for the stealer's process finds nothing.
  9. Closing text: “A Better Antivirus. Free and open source.”

How long is 158 ms?

That's how long the stealer in the video had between opening the bait and being frozen. Try to beat it: hit the pad the instant it turns red.

Why it works

Infostealers grab first and upload last. ABA lives in the gap.

Infostealers (Lumma, RedLine, Vidar, StealC…) are the most common malware on personal PCs. They sweep your browsers, wallets, Discord and Telegram sessions and documents, zip it all up and upload it, usually within seconds.

Most of them collect first and upload at the end, and collecting means opening files in known places. ABA puts tripwires in exactly those places.

A typical infostealer's run

  1. Chrome profilecollected
  2. Documentscollected
  3. Discord tokena bait: frozen
  4. Walletsnever
  5. Telegramnever
  6. Zip it upnever
  7. Uploadnever
The tripwire sits in the collecting part. What it gathered before the bait hasn't been sent yet, and now it won't be.

Four kinds of bait

  • passwords.txt · recovery phrase · 2FA codes · .kdbx

    Fake files where file grabbers look

    A password list on the Desktop, in Documents and in your home folder, a wallet recovery phrase, 2FA backup codes, a KeePass database. Every install names them differently, so they can't be skipped by name.

  • Opera · MetaMask · Exodus · Telegram · Discord · AWS

    Fake app data for apps you don't use

    Opera, Vivaldi and Yandex profiles with saved logins and cookies, MetaMask, Exodus, Electrum and Atomic wallets, Telegram sessions, Discord tokens, FileZilla servers, AWS keys. The app isn't installed, so nothing legitimate ever reads them. ABA checks what you have and never fakes those; install one later and it retires that decoy and tells you.

  • …\Chrome\User Data\Profile 23

    A fake profile in the browsers you do use

    A Profile 23 (or so) next to your real profiles in Chrome, Edge and Brave. Stealers take every profile folder; the browser only opens the ones it knows. It's the bait a stealer can't dodge by checking whether the app is really installed.

  • optional · canarytokens.org

    Canary tokens

    The fake AWS keys and a link in passwords.txt can be real canarytokens.org tokens. If someone uses them later, you get an email, even if your PC was never online to tell you.

It catches infostealers by what they do, not by recognising the file. So it works on brand-new ones no antivirus has a signature for yet.

How it works

Inside the tenth of a second.

The instant freeze, on by default. Slowed down here; the real thing typically takes about 0.1 s.

  1. ABA holds a lock on every bait. An exclusive opportunistic lock, so Windows tells ABA the moment a file is opened.
  2. A program opens one. Windows pauses it inside the open and tells ABA at once.
  3. ABA notes which threads just got stuck, and lets go.
  4. The one that wakes at that exact instant is the opener: identified precisely, never guessed.
  5. If it's suspicious, it's frozen. Typically about 0.1 s after the open (72–151 ms in ABA's tests).

To stay safe, the instant freeze only acts on ordinary programs running as you without admin rights: never on system processes or on ABA itself, and if more than one program wakes at once it doesn't guess. A program that asks Windows not to pause it is found by the handle it's left holding. Everything else is caught by the backup: Windows' own file auditing (event 4663), which takes a few ms to about 1 s. No kernel driver, no background scanning, no CPU use while idle.

Then, in order

  1. Judge how bad it is

    Automatically, from what read the bait and how. What counts as critical

  2. Freeze the whole thing

    A stealer is rarely one process. ABA freezes the reader, what it started, the loader or script host that started it, and other running copies, and holds them where only ABA's service can thaw them.

  3. Check before blaming

    It verifies the code signature. A signed, legitimate app is unfrozen and just noted.

  4. Take notes while it's frozen

    Command line, parent processes, hash, network connections.

  5. Respond

    Block its internet, kill it or isolate the PC, as you chose. aba release undoes everything.

  6. Tell you

    A desktop popup, and your phone if you set it up: ntfy, Discord webhook, Pushover or email. Kill it, or It's mine to undo it all.

What counts as critical

  • criticalAnything going through several apps' data within 2 minutes (a sweep), alone or split over several programs
  • criticalUnsigned programs in Temp, AppData, Downloads, Desktop…
  • criticalScript hosts and tools stealers hide in: PowerShell, cmd, mshta, rundll32, certutil, MSBuild…
  • criticalTricks to read unseen, injected code in a Windows program, unsigned DLLs sideloaded by a signed app
  • warnSigned apps in a user folder, scripting runtimes, other Windows programs in your session
  • infoSigned, installed software in Program Files, Windows services

Behaviour beats identity. Stealers often hide inside a legitimate program, so who opened a bait can lie. What it opened can't: a process that reads several different apps' baits is stopped as a stealer whatever it claims to be.

You choose how hard it hits

PresetCriticalWarn
Alert onlynotifynotify
Balanced defaultfreeze + block its internetnotify
Strictfreeze + block + isolate the PCfreeze

Isolation uses the Windows Filtering Platform, survives reboots so malware can't wait it out, and still lets ABA's phone alert through.

Honest limitations

Where it stops.

It's a tripwire, not a shield. Know its edges before you rely on it. The full list is in the README.

  1. It only catches infostealers that touch a bait

    A stealer that only grabs your real browser data and never touches a bait won't trip it. ABA is open source, so a stealer can be written to know it. What it can't do cheaply is tell which files are baits. But one that reads each browser's own list of profiles, takes only those and nothing else on the PC, stays under the wire.

  2. A fast stealer may get something out first

    With the instant freeze, a stealer is frozen about 0.1 s after it opens a bait (it gets the fake contents, not your real data). Without it, a few ms to about 1 s. One that uploads each item the moment it reads it may send something first; freezing stops what it hasn't sent yet.

  3. It can't beat malware with admin rights

    Malware running as administrator can stop the service, clear the audit policy or remove filters. ABA alerts if auditing is switched off, but it can't defend against an attacker who already owns the machine.

  4. The instant freeze is deliberately cautious

    It skips programs running as administrator and anything it can't pinpoint with certainty. Those are still caught by the event-log path, just a little later.

  5. Injected code is judged by its results

    Watching one process write code into another needs a kernel driver or Microsoft's protected-antivirus signing; ABA has neither. It catches injected stealers by what they read and by the code they leave in Windows programs' memory. That check skips programs that legitimately generate code (.NET, Java, browsers), and module stomping and process ghosting get past it (the sweep rule still applies). A stealer injected into an app you trusted, reading only the one bait you trusted it with, would get through. explorer.exe and a few other desktop processes are never frozen; their internet is cut instead.

  6. A reader that's already gone can't lead to its parent

    If a reader exits before its event arrives, on a PC where the instant freeze couldn't single it out, it's reported and its file's internet is cut, but whatever started it isn't known.

  7. If the service is killed mid-incident, what it froze is ended

    A hold nobody is left to release would otherwise stay frozen for good. Only a crash or kill does this; stopping, updating or reinstalling releases holds properly.

  8. Some of your own software reads files

    Backup, sync and search tools can trip a bait. One click on It's mine handles it. A backup tool that copies all of AppData looks like a sweep until you allow it.

  9. ~/.aws/credentials is quieter

    Every AWS SDK reads it, so a signed program reading it is only logged. Unsigned programs, script hosts and runtimes still trip it.

  10. Popups need you to be signed in

    Detections are always logged, phone alerts always go out, and responses happen either way.

  11. Low profile, not hidden

    The service is called “File Access Monitor” so it doesn't advertise itself to malware that checks for honeypots. It's fully visible to you.

Download

Set the trap.

Free. No account. No telemetry. Setup takes about a minute.

On Windows: after you click download

  1. Open ABA-Setup.exe

    It's in your Downloads folder. Your browser may say the file isn't commonly downloaded: choose to keep it.

  2. Windows will warn you. That's expected, for now.

    ABA's installer isn't code-signed yet; an application for free open-source signing is pending. Until then Windows doesn't recognise the file and shows its blue SmartScreen warning.

    1. Click More info.
    2. Check the app is ABA-Setup.exe, then click Run anyway.
    A drawing, not a screenshot: what you'll see after More info.

    Smart App Control. On Windows 11 PCs where Smart App Control is switched on, Windows can block an unsigned installer outright, with no Run anyway. If that happens, ABA can't be installed on that PC until signing arrives. We don't suggest switching Smart App Control off for it.

    Be sure first: check the file's SHA-256

    Every release lists the SHA-256 fingerprint of each file. If yours matches, it's the same file, byte for byte.

    1. Open SHA256SUMS.txt from the latest release and find the line ending in ABA-Setup.exe.
    2. In PowerShell (Start, type PowerShell, Enter), run this. It only reads the file:
      (Get-FileHash "$HOME\Downloads\ABA-Setup.exe").Hash
    3. The two must match (capital or small letters don't matter). If they differ, don't run the file.

    The list itself is signed with ABA's release key (SHA256SUMS.txt.sig). How releases are protected.

  3. Say yes to the admin prompt

    ABA needs administrator rights to install its background service and plant the baits.

  4. Answer two questions

    Recommended asks just two things, phone alerts and automatic updates, and uses sensible defaults for the rest. Customize lets you pick every bait and response.

  5. Watch it catch a harmless fake stealer

    Setup ends by offering a safe test. Here's what it prints:

    PowerShellDemonstration
    PS C:\Users\you> aba test
    
     A harmless copy of ABA in your Temp folder is about to read passwords.txt on the Desktop, exactly the way a stealer would. Nothing leaves your PC and your network isn't touched.
    
     ✓ Caught      critical: unsigned program running from a user-writable folder: typical of stealers
     ✓ Frozen      72 ms after it opened the bait, before it could read a byte
     ✓ Alerted     popup on your desktop, and your phone (ntfy)
     ✓ Cleaned up  the fake stealer was killed and deleted
    The end of setup in a terminal: every step ticked, then a card saying “You're protected”: 17 baits planted, Balanced response, phone alerts by ntfy, automatic updates.
    The real end of setup.

One rule afterwards: don't open your bait files. That's a read, and ABA will react. To see what's in one, use aba bait show <id>. Remove it all with aba uninstall.

For technical users: install from PowerShell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/vulnix0x4/a-better-antivirus/main/install.ps1 | iex

It downloads the latest release for your PC, checks it against the release's SHA256SUMS.txt, and starts the setup. Read the script first if you like.

Only ever paste irm … | iex commands from sources you trust. It's also how many stealers get installed (“paste this to fix your PC”). This one is in the open, short, and refuses to run a download whose checksum doesn't match.

Everything it touches

What ABA changes on a Windows PC.

This is all of it. aba uninstall undoes it.

WhatWhereOn uninstall
ProgramC:\Program Files\File Access Monitorremoved
ServiceFileAccessMonitor, runs as LocalSystem, starts with Windowsremoved
Data, alerts, logsC:\ProgramData\FileAccessMonitor, admins onlyalerts kept unless --purge
Audit policy“Audit File System: Success”restored to what it was
Baitsyour folders and fake app foldersremoved (files you made are kept)
Firewall filtersWFP provider “A Better Antivirus”, only while respondingremoved
PATHadds the program folderremoved

What goes over the network

  • Phone alerts, if you set them up.
  • Canary token creation, if you opt in (your email goes to canarytokens.org).
  • With automatic updates on, one request a day to api.github.com.

Nothing else. No telemetry.

This site keeps the same promise: no analytics, no trackers, nothing loaded from anywhere else. Even the font and the video are served from here.

  • Read every line

    MIT licensed. Source on GitHub.

  • Signed updates only

    An update installs only if SHA256SUMS.txt carries a valid ed25519 signature from ABA's release key and the file matches it. It never downgrades and rolls back if the new version doesn't start.

  • Tested on real Windows

    Every push runs a full install, fake stealers, freeze, kill, isolate and uninstall on a real Windows machine.

  • Found a way around it?

    ABA runs with system rights, so bugs matter. Report them privately: security policy.

Leave something out for them.

Get ABA

And keep Windows Defender on.